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Introduction 
 
  For decades, EU neighbours have been undemocratic, to the South in Mediterranean 
developing countries and to the East with countries under the Communist rule. Yet, the third 
wave of democratization
2 started in the EU neighbourhood, in Portugal (April 1974), Greece 
(November 1974) and Spain (November 1975), before moving to South America and Asia. In 
Eastern Europe, it is no sooner than in the late 1980s that democratization began its spread, 
forming arguably a fourth wave of democratization
3, given its characteristics that differed 
from Southern Europe (role of the internal changes in the USSR and interconnection between 
the Eastern European countries).  
  The EU has proved its efficiency to consolidate emerging democracies, notably 
through the successive enlargements in the Southern and Central Europe (1980s-2000s). Yet, 
the question of democratization remains for countries which have no certainty to become EU 
members, such as the Western Newly Independent States (Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine).  
  The December 2002 Copenhagen European Council confirmed that the EU should 
enhance relations with its neighbours on the basis of shared values – defined as democracy, 
respect of Human Rights and the rule of law. This led to the emergence of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which was developed in the context of the 2004 enlargement 
for Central Europe. According to the documents, the ENP aims at avoiding the emergence of 
new dividing lines between the EU and its neighbours, and promotes ‘European values’. 
Hence, “The EU must act to promote the regional and sub-regional cooperation and 
integration that are preconditions for political stability, economic development and the 
reduction of poverty and social divisions in our shared environment”
4.  
Beyond discourse, the ENP represents for the EU a way to safeguard three key foreign 
policy priorities concerning its neighbourhood. First, thanks to the ENP, the EU stays away 
from the question around new accessions in the near or medium term (the ‘enlargement 
fatigue’), especially in the Ukrainian case. Second, the ENP tries to contribute to the 
securitization of the neighbourhood. Last but not least, the ENP launches a process of 
                                                 
2 “A wave of democratization is a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur 
within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during 
that period of time”. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late twentieth Century, 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, p. 15. 
3 Archie Brown, Transnational Influences in the Transition from Communism, Working Paper n° 273, University 
of Notre Dame, April 2000. 
4 European Commission, “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern 
and Southern Neighbours”, COM (2003) 104 Final, p. 3   3
transformation (through Europeanization) of the neighbouring States in accordance with 
common European values (among which democratization). 
  
  This paper is then focused on the European Neighbourhood Policy and democracy 
promotion in its Eastern neighbours. Can the EU act beyond ‘hard conditionality’ experienced 
during the enlargement process in order to succeed in democratizing its neighbourhood? What 
 are  the  obstacles  to  democratisation  and  political  change  within  the  neighbours?    
  
  At the heart of the analysis lies the question of efficiency of the ENP without hard 
conditionality linked with adhesion. Conditionality, i.e. linking the granting of benefits to the 
fulfilment of some conditions, has been at the core of the EU policy when dealing with 
accession candidate countries. During the enlargement process, ‘hard conditionality’ 
(describing measures a country must meet in order to access any money or political 
retribution) was the key means for democratic norms diffusion. By contrast, neighbourhood 
policy uses conditionality in a more flexible way, which is tantamount to ‘soft conditionality’, 
destined to influence policies but not to propose a one-fits-for-all policy. It is often argued 
that because of the lack of an effective or ‘hard’ conditionality, the EU cannot pretend to a 
major role as a promoter of democratic norms.  
  At this point, it is necessary to distinguish between ‘procedural democracy’ and 
‘substantive democracy’. Procedural democracy assumes that the electoral process is at the 
core of its authority and ensures that all the procedures of elections are duly complied with. 
Thus, in this type of democracy, only the basic structures and institutions are in place. The 
concept of substantive democracy is a form of democracy which incorporates idealistic 
connotations, including citizen control over policy, responsible government, informed and 
rational deliberation, and other civic virtues. In a word, procedural democracy deals with 
technical aspects while substantive democracy is about the development of a culture. 
  This distinction being made, the European specificity through the enlargement policy 
lied in the link between the membership status and the strict application of the conditionality 
principle. The tacit consequence of this assumption implies that the EU should whether 
pursue its enlargement policy (e.g. in the Balkans) or accept to have a very limited impact in 
terms of democratization. Yet, it appears that the process of democratic norms diffusion 
cannot be limited to the sole conditionality principle in the case of Eastern neighbourhood, 
and therefore that the EU can promote its own democratic norms and standards with some 
results.    4
   In order to measure the EU’s capacity to diffuse democratic norms, Ukraine is taken as 
the main case-study in a comparative perspective towards the Central European countries, the 
Balkans and members of the ENP policy (Moldova, Caucasian and Mediterranean countries).  
 
  The first part of the study is dedicated to conditionality in the ENP as a tool for 
democratic norms diffusion. The genealogy of conditionality in the ENP is drawn in order to 
investigate on the issue of appropriateness of the democratic norms transfer. The second part 
deals with European democratic norms diffusion beyond conditionality: the “EU factor” 
develops its own dynamic of democratization, which should be properly apprehended 
altogether in order to catch the whole picture. This hypothesis should be tested by taking into 
consideration the Ukrainian “Orange Revolution”. 
 
I-  Conditionality as the main tool of a process of democratic norms diffusion 
 
‘Hard conditionality’ has been said to be by far the most efficient means to spread 
democracy in former communist countries during the whole 1990s-2000s. This means has 
worked thanks to a particular interplay between a supply-side of democratization from the EU 
and a demand-side from the neighbours, which should be put into perspective.  
 
A) The supply-side of democratic norms diffusion through ENP 
 
Historical institutionalism is likely to deal with "big structures, large processes and 
huge comparisons”
5, and traces patterns of social, political, economic behaviour and change 
across time and space
6. According to the path dependency theories
7, it may be argued that 
previous policies have largely shaped the Neighbourhood Policy, and, as a result, have 
influenced its norm diffusion process.  
                                                 
5 See Charles Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons, Nottingham, Russell Press, 1984. 
6 Institutions are here used in a broad sense: they can take the shape of a formal bureaucratic structure, but also 
an ideology or an informal costume. In emphasizing the participation of all kind of groups, not just elites or the 
state, historical institutionalism offers a dynamic approach to the history of the normative power Europe.  
7 Path dependency theories were originally developed by economists in order to explain industry evolution. Path 
dependence has primarily been used in comparative-historical analyses to observe the development and 
persistence of institutions, whether be they social, political, or cultural. In the critical juncture framework, 
antecedent conditions define and delimit agency during a critical juncture in which actors make contingent 
choices that set a specific trajectory of institutional development and consolidation that is difficult to reverse. See 
for instance Michael McFaul, “Institutional Design, Uncertainty, and Path Dependency during Transitions: Cases 
from Russia”, Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 10, n° 1, March 1999, p. 27-52; Jan Ottoson, Lars 
Magnusson, Evolutionary Economics and Path Dependence, Cheltenham, Elgar, 1997; Pierre Garrouste, Stavros 
Ioannides, Evolution and Path Dependence in Economic Ideas: Past and Present, Cheltenham, Elgar, 2001.   5
In order to understand where the ENP comes from, it is therefore necessary to consider 
four policies that have prepared it in the 1990s: on the one hand, enlargement and stabilization 
of the Balkans, and, on the other hand, the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) 
and the European Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). Each of these policies constitutes a 
particular case management of regional proximities in which the EU is involved, to a variable 
extent. Then, the ENP conditionality, working through Action plan, should be put into 
perspective. 
 
1.  Democratizing the “close neighbourhood” of Europe: conditionality, enlargement, 
presence 
  
While the enlargement policy in Central Europe and the EU presence in the Balkans 
prove differentiated, they are part of the “close neighbourhood” of Europe. The Central 
European countries are now part of the EU, and the South-Eastern states have the opportunity 
to join the EU since the Thessaloniki European Summit of 2003. Then, the use of 
conditionality has been central in these policies. 
The enlargement has generally been considered the most successful foreign policy of 
the EU so far, notably as far as democracy promotion is concerned. It is then a model for the 
ENP. The Copenhagen criteria made it clear that democracy was a non-negotiable condition 
for being part of the EU. As a result, the implementation of the acquis communautaire has 
been reached step by step thanks to a strict application of the conditionality principle (pre-
adhesion strategy, formal adhesion demand, start of the negotiating process, etc).  
The enlargement towards Central Europe has tremendous geopolitical consequences 
for the internal functioning of the EU
8. It shapes the preferences of the newly EU-25 (now 
EU-27), especially in the case of dealing Russia (dilemma partnership vs rivalry) the defining 
of the final borders of the European entity. 
9. However, enlargement cannot be used as an 
applicable model wherever, given that the EU has already 27 members. As Eneko Landaburu 
put it, “Enlargement has been a key tool in projecting stability across our continent. But it is 
                                                 
8 See for instance Christopher Hill, “The geopolitical implications of enlargement”, pp. 95-116, in Jan Zielonka 
(ed.), Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union, London, Routledge, 
2002. 
9 Julien Jeandesboz, “Alternative narratives of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Elements for a ‘genesis’ of 
the ENP”, paper presented at the Challenge doctoral training school “Perspectives on the European 
Neighbourhood”, Brussels, April 21
st-22
nd, 2006   6
a reality that the EU cannot expand ad infinitum – everything has its limits.”
10 Then, it cannot 
be the sole source of inspiration and comparison for the ENP. 
 
Alongside with the enlargement, the Balkans remained high on the security agenda 
when the policy-makers were preparing the ENP. The EU had an unsuccessful policy of 
conflict resolution in its closest neighbourhood, which has negatively affected its international 
image and credibility
11. By contrast with enlargement, the European policy in the Balkans can 
be considered as the major failure of the 1990s, given the outburst of major conflicts in the 
former Yugoslav Republics, resulting in intervention by NATO forces in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Kosovo and the Republic of Macedonia. However, by contrast with the ENP 
countries, the European Council of Thessaloniki (2003) stated that the future of Western 
Balkans
12 “is within the European Union”. Thanks to this European perspective offered, the 
EU has a stronger incentive for reforms, although the long-term perspective may not be 
attractive enough to all the political elites, what explained shortcomings in matter of 
democratization.  
Yet, if the EU conditionality has worked with Slovenia and, to a lesser extent, Croatia, 
the whole region has not been totally stabilised – considering states such as Albania, Serbia, 
and Macedonia or the case of the final status of Kosovo. By including the Balkans 
conditionality in the framework of analysis, it is underlined that conditionality with 
enlargement is a major means for democratization, but it is neither the only means, nor an all-
mighty tool.  
 
2.  Exporting democratic norms Southward and Eastward before the ENP 
 
Beyond enlargement and Balkans policies, the EU has tried to export its internal 
norms toward its Eastern borders and its Mediterranean rimland. 
After the collapse of the USSR, the EU was very much involved in the Central 
European countries and the Balkans, but was more reluctant to intervene in the European 
Post-Soviet Republics. The EU chose to negotiate a Partnership for Cooperation Agreement 
                                                 
10 Eneko Landaburu, “From Neighbourhood to Integration Policy. Are there concrete alternatives to 
enlargement?”, CEPS Policy Brief, n° 95, March 2006. Eneko Landaburu is Director General, DG External 
Relations, European Commission. 
11 See for instance Roy Ginsberg, The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire, Oxford, 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2001, p. 85. 
12 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYROM (Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia), Serbia, 
Montenegro, Kosovo.   7
(PCA) for each country. The Ukraine was the first country of the CIS to sign it in June 1994; 
however, it lately went into force on March 1998, was applied to all the former Post-Soviet 
States, except the Baltic States. The European Union (EU) has encouraged Ukraine to fully 
implement the PCA before discussions begin on an association agreement. One of the 
objectives clearly stated in the document was “to support Ukrainian efforts to consolidate its 
democracy”
13. However, this commitment to democracy was rather weak, since the political 
dialogue during the regular summit on democratic values and human rights did not prevent 
setbacks in the democratic trajectory of Ukraine, particularly in the second term of Kuchma. 
To summarize, many analysts would agree that “Overall, the EU’s policy towards Ukraine 
has lacked a clear vision, and its instruments have been rather blunt.”
14 The global 
disappointing results of this policy were an incentive to change the framework. Moreover, the 
Post-Soviet countries are far from being a homogeneous group now after more than 15 years 
of evolution, especially in terms of political outcomes. The EU has for instance much less 
leverage in Central Asia than in Ukraine or Moldova, because of geographic and human 
proximity. 
 
Finally, the lessons of the Euro Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), initiated in 1995, 
should be drawn, since it is also becoming part of the ENP (as the PCAs). This large strategy, 
more comprehensive than the previous ones, tried to avoid the marginalisation of the Southern 
and Mediterranean countries after EU Eastward enlargement. The EMP was basically 
designed as a process to create a framework for multilateral as well as bilateral dialogue, and 
co-operation. Conditionality was a means to achieve democracy promotion: “The 
conditionality clause entitles either party to the agreement to take appropriate measures, 
including suspending the agreement, in the event that the other party fails to comply with 
specified human rights norms. This clause has been designed to provide a legal basis for the 
application of sanctions against a country that violates human rights and democratic 
principles. It was intended to avoid situations in which the European Community might find 
itself unable to suspend agreements with countries responsible for human rights atrocities”
15. 
However, the results in terms of democratization have proved dubious: “Both bilateral 
Association Agreements (…) and multilateral documents attach great importance to progress 
                                                 
13 Partnership and Co-operation Agreement between the European Communities and their member states and 
Ukraine, Article 1. 
14 Kataryna Wolczuk, “Ukraine’s European Choice”, Centre for European Reforms Policy brief, downloadable 
at: http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/policybrief_ukraine.pdf, p.2 
15 Elena Baracani, “From the ENP to the EMP: New European pressure for democratization?”, Journal of 
Contemporary European Research, Vol. 1, n°2, November 2005, p. 55   8
on democracy and human rights, yet in practice the EU has not shown any determination to 
see that such undertakings were respected: for example, it has no applied ‘conditionality 
clauses’”
16. As such, the EMP has been a laboratory for the ENP policy, under the conditions 
of a poor utilisation of the leverage of conditionality. 
 
3.  The ENP and democratic conditionality through Action plan 
 
The global synthesis of how conditionality was used in the previous policies gives 
some features of the ENP democratic conditionality. This policy aims at being as efficient as 
enlargement, to limit the risk of destabilisation that occurred in the Balkans and to avoid the 
absence of an efficient democratic conditionality of the PCA and EMP. The priorities between 
various goals (security, stability, prosperity) may very well lean toward an interest-driven 
agenda (security) rather than democracy promotion
17, depending on the country or the region 
concerned. 
  However, it is equally true that the emerging paradigm of the late 1980s, making good 
governance, democracy, security and development go together, has paved the way for an EU 
as a promoter of democratic norms. Thus, both the soar of CFSP
18 and the adoption of the 
European Security Strategy
19, which have also played a great role in the shaping of this 
policy, is not an obstacle to the idea according to which the ENP can be an effective 
democratic norms diffusion process. As such, the ESS is based on a concept of 
“comprehensive security”
20, which dates back from the Helsinki Final Act (1975), and 
underlines the idea of interdependence. This idea broadens the defence perspective by taking 
into account basic Human Rights and fundamental freedoms, economy, ecology, as well as 
peace and stability. Because of this interdependence, the EU would prefer to have a 
democratic neighbour, supposedly more stable and more reliable, than an autocratic one. 
                                                 
16 Martin Ortega, “A new EU policy on the Mediterranean?”, in Chaillot Paper, n°64, September 2003, p. 92. 
17 Here, the comparison with the EMP proves useful, given that the policy towards Southern neighbours is 
sometimes less linked with liberal idealism than with realism, according to some authors. However, some 
differences can be made between Eastern and Southern neighbours. For the instance of Morocco, see Francesco 
Cavatorta, Raj Chari, Sylvia Kritzinger, “The European Union and Morocco. Security through 
Authoritarianism?”, Reihe Politikwissenschaft / Political Science Series, n° 110, June 2006. The application of 
political conditionality seems more assertive in Ukraine than in Morocco. See Elena Baracani, “ENP political 
conditionality. A comparison between Morocco and Ukraine”, paper presented at the conference “Perspective on 
the European Neighbourhood Policy” at CEPS, Brussels, April 21-22
nd 2006. 
18 Jolyon Howorth, “Global Trends and European Norms in the Field of Security and Defence Policy”, 
presentation given at the conference “Are European Preferences Shared by Others? The Fate of European 
Norms in a Globalized World” at CERI, Paris, June 24
th, 2006. 
19 Downloadable at: http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf#search=%22EU%20security%20strategy%22. 
20 See for instance: Sven Biscop, The European Security Strategy: a Global Agenda for Positive Power, 
Aldershot, Hants, England, Ashgate, 2005.   9
Beyond the normative goal to promote “shared values”, the democratization of the neighbours 
is supposed to help security at home. The ESS legitimates the ENP by insisting on the 
securitization of the neighbourhood: “Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still 
important. It is in the European interests that countries on our borders are well-governed. 
(…) It is not in our interest that enlargement should create new dividing lines in Europe. We 
need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the 
East while tackling political problems there.”
21 Hence, the ENP birth is largely inspired by 
the security anxieties of the ESS, and not much by the objectives of encouraging reforms as in 
the strategic papers of 2004
22. 
 
  Thus, the study of conditionality in the supply-side toolbox shows that it is a highly 
important means in order to export the EU model in its neighbourhood. Concretely, in return 
for concrete progress in democratic reforms, aligning Ukrainian standard with the European 
acquis,  the Commission   suggested that Kiev should  be offered the prospect  of a 
stake in the EU’s  internal market  and further integration (notably  in terms of freedom of 
movement for people).  
The conditionality envisaged in the ENP works through bilateral relations between the 
EU and the country partner, resulting in an ‘Action plan’
23. This document, ‘tailor-made’, 
becomes the ‘roadmap’ on which the level of cooperation can be estimated and sets out short 
and medium-term priorities. Ukraine has signed its own Action plan in February 2005 for 
three-year duration. This Action Plan is cross-pillar, setting out comprehensive sets of 
priorities in political, economic and security areas of co-operation. It underlines the primary 
importance of the respect for democratic values and human rights. Despite the differences in 
the precise agendas for each neighbouring state, they are drawn on a common set of principles 
and have a similar structure, which seems to be derived from the experience of the accession 






                                                 
21 ESS, p. 8. 
22 “European Neighbourhood Policy – Strategy Paper”, COM(2004) 373 Final, 15 May 2004. 
23 In December 2004, the European Commission has launched the first seven Action Plans under the ENP. 
(Israel, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Tunisia and Ukraine).   10
B) The demand-side for a process of democratic norms diffusion 
 
  The will to diffuse democratic norms through ‘hard conditionality’ cannot be effective 
without a strong influence of local actors in favour of the adoption of the democratic norms. 
Thus, the ‘demand-side’ of the problem should not be forgotten, given that the political 
leadership in new members was dedicated to democratic reforms, which in the end has made 
the success of the enlargement policy. 
 
1.  An interactive approach of the ENP 
 
The relationship between international actors, such as the EU, and the domestic actors 
has been underestimated as a factor under which conditionality can work. The social 
interaction, as a process consisting of actions, reactions, and mutual adaptations is central in 
the diffusion of democratic values.  
After the demise of the USSR, significant resources were made available by the 
European Union to assist Ukraine in its transition from a communist regime to an emerging 
democracy. It has helped to support training, capacity-building and projects aimed at 
developing democracy. It is therefore necessary to remind that European norms and rules 
affect neighbouring countries’ policy choices through the action of domestic political actors. 
Government officials (or members of the political game) and societal groups (members of the 
civil society) can appeal to an international rule or norm in an effort to further their objectives 
in the national area. The latter were for instance crucial in the internationalisation of the 
“Orange Revolution” when they broadcast images of the overcrowded Maidan place
24.  
Then, two conditions can be identified for the appropriation of European norms by 
domestic actors
25: the structural internal context and the signification of the norm on the 
internal plan.  
First, the EU should take into account the question of “appropriateness” of the norms. 
The ENP should keep in mind the initial conditions of the neighbours, whose starting point is 
sometimes far enough from a stable state, e.g. being captured by interest groups (oligarchies) 
as in the Kuchma’s Ukraine. As Ivan Krastev puts it, “one clear thread is visible in the post-
communist puzzle of success and failure: only nation-states have succeeded in the European 
                                                 
24 See for instance Andrew Wilson, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, Yale, Yale University Press, 2005. 
25 Andrew P. Cortell, James W. Davis, “How Do International Institutions Matters? The Domestic Impact of 
International Rules and Norms”, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 40, 1996, p. 451-478.   11
integration project”
26. If the state apparatus is not able to carry through the reforms, or does 
not respect the rule of law, no conditionality could work. The European integration 
presupposes both national consensus and a functioning and legitimate state for its citizens, 
and to understand that it is more a project of internal transformation than a civilisation-based 
geopolitical choice.  
Second, conditionality efficiency relies on the neighbour elites and their political will. 
For years, under Kuchma’s rule, Ukraine has mainly had a declaratory policy concerning 
Europe, wishing “integration without Europeanization”
27. Leadership took stances in favour 
of rapprochement with the EU, but if nobody was against European integration, less people 
were in favour of harsh reforms, especially in the economic sector, the Eastern part of Ukraine 
being more industrialized than the Western one. The European candidacy was a way for 
Ukrainian foreign policy to open new options and lessen dependency toward Moscow, 
without claiming for immediate NATO adhesion. This issue of the NATO enlargement was 
much more contentious in Russia in the 1990s than the enlargement of the EU
28, although this 
perception increasingly put into question after the mediation of the European troika during the 
Orange Revolution.  
 
2.  Conditionality, domestic actors and democratic norms importation  
 
The “demand-side” should emphasize on domestic actors and effects of conditionality, 
in order to understand well the local conditions for democratic norms diffusion. The 
“enlargement rhetoric” (implying that an enlargement promise is a prerequisite for democracy 
promotion) tends to underestimate the weigh of domestic actors in the process of democratic 
norms diffusion. If the Central European political elites were united and supported by peoples 
to reform, the situation is more complex in Ukraine (as it is currently in the Balkans, despite 
enlargement promise).  
It is generally well noted that Ukraine's foreign policy orientation is determined by the 
internal dynamics of Ukrainian politics and society, and rests on the dilemma between Russia 
and the West. Cultural and identity issues play an important role in the debate on the general 
character of foreign policy in Ukraine as do interest groups lobbying for a pro-Russian or a 
                                                 
26 Ivan Krastev, “Bringing the State Back up”, Conference paper, September 2003, http://suedosteuropa-
gesellschaft.com, quoted in Judy Batt, “The Western Balkans: Moving on”, Chaillot Paper, n°70, October 2004, 
p. 13.  
27 Kataryna Wolczuk, “Integration without Europeanisation: Ukraine and its Policy toward the European Union”, 
EUI Working Papers, RSCAS N°2004/15, October 2004. 
28 See Dov Lynch (ed.), What Russia sees, Paris, Chaillot Paper, January 2005, n°74.    12
pro-European orientation. The East-West divide in historical terms remains a major cleavage 
in Ukrainian politics, as it was heavily emphasized during the Orange Revolution. The 
internal balance of power between Russian and Ukrainian culture and language is closely 
linked with the foreign policy orientation. Elites from the Eastern city of Donetsk and the 
Western city of Lviv have lobbied extensively for a Russia-centred and an EU-centred foreign 
policy respectively. It was uppermost in the leaders’ mind in Kiev, and they have responded 
with a policy that prevents the alienation of major ethnic groups in Ukrainian society by 
steering a ‘multi-vector policy’ between Russia and the EU. For all those reasons, the 
domestic actors are central in the democratic norms importation, on the condition that they do 
not mix the implementation of a democratic regime with geopolitical orientation. 
 
Finally, democratic norms importation and conditionality, the main incentives for 
reforms, may be contradicting in the case of Ukraine. It is worth mentioning that if 
conditionality was the key factor of the enlargement policy, this process of transformation 
was in the end legitimate because it contains an element of democratic legitimacy through 
popular referenda. Yet, in the case of the ENP, reforms implied by the EU conditionality 
would have no democratic accountability, given that it does not enable a negative feedback 
after the implementation of the acquis. There can be no referendum on that issue, and the 
neighbours could not be represented in the EU institutions. Therefore, there is a fundamental 
dilemma between exporting democratic norms without democratic accountability, or being 
accused of lacking of political will as a promoter of democracy.  
In the early stage, Nathalie Tocci notes, “the ENP contained elements of 
conditionality. The 2003 Wider Europe Communication explicitly stated that: “in return for 
concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, 
economic and institutional reforms… the EU’s neighbourhood should benefit from the 
prospect of closer integration with the EU”
29. However, as she follows, this approach has 




                                                 
29 Nathalie Tocci, “Does the ENP Respond to the EU’s Post-Enlargement Challenges?”, The International 
Spectator, Vol. XL, n° 1, 2005, p.25. The term “return” is in italic in original. 
30 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the Council, European Neighbourhood 
Policy Stategy Paper”, COM(2004) 373 Final, Brussels, 12 May 2004.   13
As such, the core role played by conditionality to promote democracy has been 
underlined, but put in a relational perspective. If conditionality cannot play the same role as it 
did during the enlargement, can other means ensure the diffusion of democracy in Ukraine? 
 
 
II-  Beyond conditionality? European democratic norms diffusion in the light of 
the Ukrainian Orange Revolution 
 
Most of the analysis of the ENP underlines the crucial role of conditionality, as in the 
enlargement process. Yet, it turns a blind eye to the fact that norms can diffuse through other 
means. 
After considering various democratic norms diffusion models, the Orange Revolution 
is taken as a case-study in order to define the ability of the EU to promote its preference for 
democracy.  
 
A) ENP, EU and democratic norms diffusion: alternative views to “hard conditionality only” 
 
The ENP and, beyond, the EU as a global actor, can promote his message of 
democracy in the neighbourhood by other means than conditionality. In fact, if the 
conditionality principle is closely linked with a policy (ENP here), the promotion of 
democracy should take into account the broader influence of the EU, its ‘soft power’. 
According to Joseph Nye, it “rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others”
 31. Thus, 
the EU is not only considered as a “Westphalian actor”
32 in international relations, but also 
analysed its capabilities through the prism of its “presence”
33. As Hill put it, this concept 
emphasizes “outside perceptions of the Community and the significant effect it has on both 
                                                 
31 Joseph .S. Nye Jr, Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics, New York, Public Affairs, 2004, p.5. 
On the limits of the characterization of the EU as a soft power only, see Zaki Laïdi,  norme sans la force, l’énigme 
de la puissance européenne, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2005, p. 26-35. 
32 The concept of ‘actorness’ incorporates both the internal dynamics of institutional development and the 
changing nature of the international environment in which the EU has to operate. The concept diffuses the 
classical notion of what constitutes an ‘international actor’. See Mette Sicard Filtenborg, Stefan Gänzle, 
Elizabeth Johansson, “An alternative Theoretical Approach to EU Foreign Policy. ‘Network Governance’ and 
the Case of the Northern Dimension Initiative”, Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International 
Studies Association, Vol. 37, n° 4, p. 391-392. 
33 Dave Allen, Mike Smith, “Western Europe’s Presence in the Contemporary International Area”, Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 16, n° 1, p. 19-37.   14
psychological and the operational environments of third parties”
34. This presence is a 
precondition for ‘actorness’, both concepts being useful to catch the power of influence of the 
EU as a promoter of democracy
35. 
 
  Paul Kubicek identifies three tools thanks to which the EU can promote democracy in 
Ukraine
36: conditionality, contagion and convergence. It is worth noting that those tools are 
not exclusive but can function altogether.  
Many analysts remind that conditionality should be less efficient in Ukraine, because 
it does not offer the “carrot” of an enlargement promise. At the same time, there is neither a 
“stick” policy, since the EU is rather reluctant to impose sanctions to third-parties. The EU 
feared that sanctions would marginalise Ukraine, and give birth to a Kiev-Moscow axis at its 
expense. Restricting the EU-Ukraine relationship through the prism of conditionality limits 
the analysis to the formal relations among states, and forgets the informal interactions – such 
as socialisation of state elites and different sectors of society. 
Contagion refers to the EU non-intentionally spreading norms, by its very presence in 
the international era, as a model of regional integration or through the gravity model of 
democratization
37. During the Kuchma era (1994-2004), contagion seems to have had a 
limited impact, given the fact that Ukraine has not followed the path of the Central European 
countries. It has not changed in the same direction as the newly EU members. 
Convergence “entails gradual movement in system conformity with a grouping of 
established democratic states”
38, and results from the internationalization of democratic 
norms, growingly accepted. Persuasion and elite socialisation are used to support convergence 
to the desired norms.  
  
  To make a synthesis of these theories, three levels of a conceptual framework need to 
be distinguished in order to incorporate the ‘EU factor’ in the democratization of non-
                                                 
34 Christopher Hill, “The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role”, Journal 
of Common Market Studies, Vol. 31, n°3, 1993, p. 309. 
35 Charlotte Bretheron, John Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, New York, Routledge, 2003, p.35. 
36 Paul Kubicek, “The European Union and democratization in Ukraine”, Communist and Post-Communist 
Studies, vol. 38, n°2, June 2005, p. 269-292. 
37 Michael Emerson, Gergana Noutcheva, “Europeanisation as a Gravity Model of Democratisation”, CEPS 
Working Document, n°214, November 2004. 
38 Geoffrey Pridham, “Rethinking regime-change theory and the international dimension of democratization: ten 
years after in East-Central Europe”, in Geoffrey Pridham, Attila Agh, Prospects for democratic consolidation in 
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candidates but potentially member states
39. First, the EU promotes democratization through 
political dialogue, by the means of regular summits, committee meetings and negotiations 
within existing framework. Second, there is a direct influence of the EU on elite mentalities 
and external policy orientation. The idea of the “return to Europe”, which was a motto of 
Central European countries during their transformation, has catalysed the effect of “magnet 
Europa”. Third, the EU supports the NGO sector in Ukraine, and has developed programs to 
strengthen civil society. 
 
B) The “Orange Revolution” in perspective 
 
In order to evaluate the EU in terms of democracy promotion, it is necessary to 
reconsider the Orange Revolution, by distinguishing two sequences of action in which 
different interactions will lead to democratic norm diffusion: “Revolution as a moment” and 
“Revolution as a movement”.  
   
1.  Reconsidering the Orange Revolution  
  
  The preconditions of the Orange Revolution, in order to evaluate the EU effect in the 
diffusion of democratic norms, should be noted.  
 
The Orange Revolution cannot be understood apart from the features of the former 
regime, given that scholars consider that domestic factors continue to be decisive for the 
success or failure of democratization
40. The Kuchma regime can be categorised as a 
“competitive authoritarianism”
41, that is to say a hybrid fusion of the former Soviet system 
and the emerging reformed economy and polity. Yet, the project of a full authoritarian 
Ukrainian regime has failed both because of oligarchs divisions and a formidable 
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at the conference “New Perspectives on Contemporary Ukraine: Poliics, History, and Culture” at the University 
of Toronto, March 17
th-19
th, 2006. 
40 According to Michael McFaul, preconditions greatly help democratic breakthrough to happen. See Michael 
McFaul, “Transitions from Post-Communism”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 16, n° 3, July 2005, p. 5-19. 
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opposition
42. This opposition illuminates the role of civil society in the failure of Yanukovych 
take-over on power. It has heavily been emphasised in the studies of the Orange Revolution
43.  
 
In order to understand the dynamics of this massive social movement, the term of 
“Revolution” should be further defined. According to Motyl, revolution can be conceived as 
“a type of upheaval (sudden, mass), a type of change (rapid, fundamental, comprehensive), or 
a type of turmoil (sustained, all encompassing)”
44. The third type, “Revolution as turmoil”, 
synonymous with “chaos”, seems misleading given the peaceful character of the Orange 
Revolution. Then, defining Revolution as an upheaval would be tantamount to consider that 
the Orange Revolution runs from November 2004 to the so-called “third round” of the 
elections (December 2004). The other type, “Revolution as a change” lasting from November 
2004 to July 2006 (come back of Yanukovych as Prime Minister
45), is also persuasive, 
because it constitutes a whole cycle of the Ukrainian democratic trajectory.  
 
This distinction between “Revolution as a moment” and “Revolution as a movement” 
is useful to assess the European ability to promote democracy. These two sequences imply 
different sets of actions and types of influence, which should be analysed. 
 
2.  Revolution as a moment: the EU and the crisis 
 
The presidential elections of 2004 announced long before as “watershed”
46 for the 
democratic trajectory of Ukraine, because massive frauds were expected and done. It was 
fought by a lasting mobilization of citizens on the Maidan place in Kiev, forming part of a 
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“coloured revolution”
47. Many competing explanations can be endorsed in the case of the EU 
democratic promotion in the case of crisis-management. 
The realists would generally be sceptics about the EU as an international actor, given 
the fact that internal structures of EU governance could paralyse the foreign policy-makers 
from reaching agreements on the formulation and implementation of coherent foreign policy, 
because the member-states and institutions pursue their own self-interests
48. The EU stance 
during the crisis seems to invalidate, in that case, this framework of analysis. A realist stance 
would have pushed toward inaction, since many members in the EU consider that Ukraine and 
Russia are closely linked, and should have then lower the chance of a common action to 
happen.  
By contrast, the liberal intergovernmental theory may give some clue to analyse how 
the EU has fostered democratic promotion in the Orange Revolution case. Andrew Moravcsik 
defines this theory through policy demand (domestic preference formation), policy supply 
(interstate bargaining), and supranational institutions
49; at the end of the day, domestic 
interests are a driving force shaping the pattern of cooperation at the European level. The EU 
“Eastern dimension” can be seen as a preference of the Central European countries for order 
at their borders. Their new weigh within the EU has been fundamental in the making of the 
decision to support the opposition, as the case of Poland seems to show.  
 
This debate is particularly obvious when the respective positions of Germany (the 
leader of the old EU member states for Eastern policy) and of Poland (the leader of the new 
members) are mentioned about the ENP and Moscow.  
After 1989, Berlin had three strategic objectives
50: maintaining good relations with 
Moscow; playing a decisive role on behalf of Central European countries, e.g. Poland; and 
coordinating German initiatives with its European and transatlantic partners. Until the Orange 
Revolution, Berlin answered to the Ukrainian aspiration toward Europe that it should reform 
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its political institutions and strengthen its civil society. Yet, the reactions during the crises 
were rather limited comparing with Poland, Schroeder having a very personalized relation 
with Vladimir Putin. 
By contrast, Warsaw claims that the EU should continue to enlarge to neighbouring 
countries in order to avoid them to fall in the Russian orbit. The Polish leadership believes in 
the ‘Brzezinski Principle’ according to which “it cannot be stressed enough that without 
Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, 
Russia automatically becomes an empire”
51. The considerations about the Orange Revolution 
are enlightening in this respect: Kwasniewski overtly claimed in December 2004 that ‘Russia 
without Ukraine is a better solution than Russia with Ukraine’
52, whereas two years later, the 
former President Walesa criticized the West: “we have lost Belarus and now we risk losing 
Ukraine”
53. The value-driven Polish agenda for democratic promotion in Ukraine was mixed 
with an equally important interest-driven agenda for preventing a Kiev-Moscow axis. 
The visible role and presence of Poland during the Orange Revolution can be 
explained thanks to geography (Poland shares borders with Ukraine, as well as Belarus and 
Russia with the Kaliningrad oblast’) and history, since large parts of contemporary Ukraine 
have been under Polish rule longer than under Russian rule. Until the Versailles Congress 
(1918), the Polish political thought aimed at the reconstitution of the pre-1772 Greater Poland 
to accomplish its ‘mission civilisatrice’. It is not by chance that publications dealing with the 
Eastern frontiers of Poland flourished in the 1990s
54. Hence, Poland has been politically very 
active in the making of this policy, both at the level of think-tanks and government, and has 
for long developed networking activities in Kiev
55. The EU programs to reinforce civil society 
were fundamentally more able to strengthen civil society (through the PHARE program in 
Central Europe) than to create the “third sector” in the CIS countries (through the TACIS 
project). 
Yet, if the notion of preferences is well embedded in Moravcsik’s work and useful for 
my purpose, considering “revolution as a moment” implies to lay more the emphasis on the 
non-state actors. In that regard, a tempered constructivism, in order to answer the need of a 
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multi-actor theory, should be favoured. Rather than focusing on state interests (USA, Russia, 
Poland) and EU institutions and policies (ENP), the need for a multi-level governance to 
explain the dynamics of the EU. The informal interactions between states and societies are 
preferred to formal relations between states.  
In fact, the EU politics can be understood as the two-way process of policy-making 
and institution-building at the European level which then feeds back into the member states 
and their political process and structures, including NGOs. Poland has not acted by itself in 
Ukraine, but has been successful because it has resorted to a whole set of formal and informal 
rules as well as socialisation patterns of the EU foreign policy. As such, the EU has acted on 
two plans, both as an observer and a mediator. In cooperation with the OSCE, the EU has sent 
observers for the presidential elections. Thanks to this information they provided, the EU has 
from the very start denounced the frauds, while Russian president congratulated Yanukovych. 
Moreover, the post-enlargement EU has acted as an efficient mediator, with a troika 
composed by the Polish President Kwasniewski
56, the Lithuanian President Adamkus and the 
High-Representative for ESDP, Javier Solana. However, the Polish posture raised some 
opposition within the EU, or at least scepticism. For instance, José Borell, President of the 
European Parliament, criticized the role of Poland and Lithuania for acting under the 




The EU role may also be considered through the prism of “revolution as a movement”, 
and thus embracing the whole transformation process of Ukraine. 
 
3.  Revolution as a movement: ‘Sustainable Revolution’ and substantive democracy? 
 
The Orange Revolution started a process of democratic reforms, particularly in terms 
of press freedom and transparency; as such, it has improved the democratic governance 
beyond the respect of elections.   
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Yet, the ‘democratic transition’ concept has recently been under attack, being too 
closely linked to a procedural definition of democracy. Carothers identified five assumptions 
that have proved misleading in the past decade
58. First, Ukraine was a hybrid regime during 
the Kuchma era, but the demise of his chosen successor (Yanukovych) does not necessary 
lead to democracy in the short or medium term. Second, the democratic trajectory of Ukraine 
in the 1990s and 2000s shows that there are reversals in the course of democratization. If 2004 
was a turning point, it is far from being enough to get rid of the Kuchma era. Third, if respect 
for the elections is central for democratization, it does not equate with democracy per se. 
Fourth, whereas it was generally assumed that economic development, history and socio-
cultural factors would not be major factors, the Orange revolution has shown two competing 
mobilisation from the opposing sides. Last but not least, democratization requires a coherent, 
functioning state, whereas the Ukrainian State has been at times captured by oligarchic groups 
and sometimes suffers from inconsistency. The whole set of critiques partially explains why 
the ‘Orange parties’ have lost the momentum of democratization of late 2004. 
Apart from the 2004 crisis, the Orange Revolution initiated a process of internal 
reforms in Ukraine and realignment in foreign policy. The answer of the EU was rather 
technical than political, in the sense that it offers a wide range of possibilities within the ENP 
framework. Although trying not to alienate Russia too much, deeply concerned by its “near 
abroad”
59 and even more by Ukraine
60, the new government shows its willingness to 
cooperate with the EU. The most visible effort of Ukraine in regional cooperation has been 
made in a European monitoring-border operation (EUBAM) on the Transnistrian-Ukrainian 
segment
61. The EU, Moldova and Ukraine signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the 
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Border Assistance Mission on October 7
th, 2005, whereas the official opening ceremony was 
celebrated on December 1
st, 2005. The goal of the mission was to ensure security at the EU 
border and to prevent smuggling, trafficking and customs fraud by giving advice and training. 
Yet, if the democratization of Transnistria may be a step toward conflict settlement, the EU 
has not put the emphasis on that objective
62. It was rather concerned with security matters 
rather than democracy promotion, which may in the end legitimate the existence of the 
secessionist entity. Although the security aspects may also be normative, they remind that 
stability and security are sometimes favoured in lieu of democratization.    
After the flawed elections of 2004, the European authorities immediately supported 
the claims of the opposition. On January 31
st, 2005, the European Council stated that recent 
events had clearly shown the choice of the Ukrainian electors in favour of democracy, 
founded on the respect of fundamental liberties and peace. On February 21
st, the European 
Council declared again his determination to support an ambitious program of political and 
economic reforms, with an Action plan in ten points. However, despite being critical of the 
ENP, Ukraine still has to evolve in its framework. Another incentive was given to it in 
December 2005 when Kiev was officially recognized as a “market-economy”. Finally, neither 
the European Commission nor the European Council have taken commitments on that matter, 
and the European Parliament only evoked it on January 13
th, 2005. 
At the same time, Ukraine wishes recognition for a perspective to join the EU, 
showing that the ENP remains in the shadow of enlargement. According to the Ukrainian 
political leadership, the ENP is unsatisfactory, but it is taken pragmatically as a “second best”, 
a way to strengthen the European profile of their country: “We do not support the idea that the 
ENP should be distinct from the policy of the EU enlargement. On the contrary, we believe 
that by enhancing cooperation and encouraging reforms it could be of great help in 
supporting Ukraine's European aspirations. It should become a short-term model of relations, 
designed to prepare the ground for a Ukraine's progressive integration into the EU.”
63 
However, it is well understood in Kiev that the EU enlargement is a very long prospect, with 
many traps. That is why the Ukrainian political leadership favours an adhesion to NATO 
before trying to join the EU, following the Baltic path of the 1990s. It is however doubtful 
that this path is still an indicated way for an EU accession, given the lack of enthusiasm for a 
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new enlargement in many European countries, more cautions about the public opinion mood 
after the failure of the referenda in France and the Netherlands.  
If the Orange Revolution has paved the way for deeper European integration and a 
pluralisation of the political development in Ukraine, it is still not clear if a ‘sustainable 
Revolution’ heading toward a more substantive conception on democracy is going to take 






   
This article has favoured the expression of “process of democratic norms diffusion”, 
emphasizing the endogenous component of democracy, rather than “normative power 
Europe”. The concepts are largely compatible, since they equally presuppose the will of the 
EU to export or diffuse its own principles, particularly with democratic norms in its European 
neighbourhood, a constitutive part of its internal model. They equally presuppose the 
diffusion of norms, such as free-and-fair elections (as in a procedural democracy), but also of 
values that constitutes the European model of democracy (in accordance with a more 
substantive definition of democracy). After all, democracy cannot be reduced to a “project” 
and civil society to “international NGOs”, the social engineering from outside should be 
correctly ingrained for a sustainable democratization. If the EU is not the only promoter of 
democratic procedures – the OSCE has played a great role in that sense during the Orange 
Revolution –, it nevertheless tries to encourage the democratization of Ukraine in the long run 
through the Action plan.  
In a word, there can be no democratic promotion without will of importation expressed 
by the target countries. The enlarged Europe puts much more emphasis on the democratic 
values, thanks to the new members, but it does not necessarily mean that the EU should be 
more successful than in the past. The proxy for enlargement in the ENP – access to the 
internal market and visa facilities – may very well have a positive impact on democratization, 
on the condition that the neighbours’ elites are involved and supported in their effort by a 
large part of their population. 
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Finally, the precedent development led us to two concluding remarks. 
The first remains that if conditionality is always linked to the enlargement policy in 
order to prove its efficiency, it is equally true that the current countries of the Balkans have 
European perspectives, but with much less result. It is due to the fact that the literature 
concerning political conditionality is centred on enlargement and on the “supply-side” part of 
the problem. The domestic forces driving the internal change and the state capacity of the 
target country have sometimes been largely underestimated in that equation. 
The second highlights the fact that conditionality has been considered as the only way 
through which democracy has progressed in the target countries. It is true that it has been an 
accelerator of democratization, but other means, as the study of the ‘EU factor’ suggests, 
should not be turned a blind eye. 